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The Death of Deference and the Domestication of 
Treaty Law 
Harlan Grant Cohen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, “Courts in the United States have final authority 
to interpret an international agreement for the purposes of applying 
it as law in the United States, but will give great weight to an 
interpretation made by the executive branch.”1 Such “great weight” 
or deference reflects a common wisdom that the president plays a 
special constitutional role with regard to treaties. The president 
negotiates treaty terms and is thought to have special knowledge as 
to their meaning to the parties. The president knows what 
interpretations will best forward U.S. interests in the world. The 
president directs foreign relations with the United States’ treaty 
counterparties and has insight into both how they interpret these 
provisions and how they might react to various interpretations 
adopted by the United States. And it is the president and the 
executive branch that deal with the fallout from any U.S. 
interpretation with which other treaty parties disagree. In these 
regards, deference to the executive in treaty interpretation fits within 
a broader picture of deference to the executive in U.S. foreign 
relations law more generally.2 According to conventional wisdom, 
dealing with foreign states requires special expertise, discretion, 
flexibility, and speed that militate in favor of presidential dominance 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to the 
participants in the BYU Law Review Symposium on Treaty Law and Pamela Bookman for their 
helpful comments and insights and to Gary Ashcroft, Jena Emory, Morganne Patterson, 
Christopher Shaun Polston, Dov Preminger, and Tyler Washburn for invaluable 
research assistance. 
 1.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 2.  See Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the 
Roberts Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380, 386–87 (2015) (describing the 
conventional wisdom). 
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over foreign relations and special forbearance to the executive in 
interpreting and applying foreign relations law.3 When it comes to 
foreign relations, “Let the president do his job” becomes a common 
legal refrain. 
But recent cases question whether this picture still reflects the 
reality of foreign relations law and whether the Restatement’s 
assessment is still accurate. In response to the government’s 
interpretation of a treaty in one case, the Supreme Court responded 
simply: “That reasoning is erroneous.”4 In another, the Court 
explained that, “while we respect the Government’s views about the 
proper interpretation of treaties . . . we have been unable to find any 
other authority or precedent”5 suggesting their view is correct. And 
during oral arguments in a third treaty-interpretation case, the 
Solicitor General was asked by a Justice, “[I]s there any possibility 
that there is any other country in the world that has the slightest 
interest in how the United States or any of its subdivisions deals with 
the particular situation that’s involved in this case?”6 At least in these 
cases, the Court seems less than deferential to the executive branch’s 
views. Whatever weight the Court is giving them, it certainly seems 
less than “great.”7 
At the same time, the Court seems to be domesticating the 
questions presented in treaty cases. Rather than focusing on the 
treaty and what its terms might mean in relations between the 
United States and others, the Court has been turning the question 
inward, focusing on implementing legislation, congressional intent, 
and ordinary methods of statutory interpretation. The effect of this 
trend is to reinforce the trend away from deference; by presenting 
the question as one of domestic lawmaking rather than of foreign 
relations, the Court disintegrates the arguments for executive 
 
 3.  Id.; see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 4.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006). 
 5.  BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014) (“We do not accept the 
Solicitor General’s view as applied to the treaty before us.”). 
 6.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) 
(No. 12–158). 
 7.  Though admittedly, as Jean Galbraith points out in her contribution to this 
symposium, there has long been questions as to exactly how much weight “great weight” 
implied. Jean Galbraith, What Should the Restatement (Fourth) Say About Treaty 
Interpretation?, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1499, 1502–03 (2016). 
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interpretative primacy, while underlining arguments for the 
Court’s own. 
This reasoning from recent treaty cases, while seemingly out of 
step with prior practice and the Restatement (Third), fits well with 
broader trends in foreign relations law jurisprudence from the 
United States Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice John Roberts. 
Elsewhere,8 I have argued that (over the past ten years) the Roberts 
Court has been methodically whittling away the deference it 
traditionally granted to political branches in foreign relations by: (1) 
tightening its control over treaty interpretation in cases like Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld,9 Bond v. United States,10 and BG Group, PLC v. 
Argentina;11 (2) limiting the president’s ability to override state laws 
in Medellín v. Texas12 and to act without Congress in Hamdan and 
Medellín; (3) rejecting the president’s construction of foreign 
relations statutes in Hamdan, Bond, and Argentina v. NML Capital, 
Ltd.;13 and (4) increasing the Court’s oversight over foreign relations 
by shrinking the scope of the political-question doctrine in Zivotofsky 
v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I).14  
Ten years into the Roberts Court,15 the timeworn cliché that 
foreign affairs are different may simply no longer be valid. This may 
be the result of a backlash against perceived overreaching by the 
executive, a realization that globalization imbues even the most 
mundane of affairs with foreign affairs implications, a shift in the 
politics of the members of the Court, or a long-fused reckoning with 
the end of the Cold War.16 But even after a strongly deferential and 
 
 8.  Cohen, supra note 2. 
 9.  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 10.  134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 11.  134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014). 
 12.  552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 13.  134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014) (noting that “Argentina and the United States urge 
us to consider the worrisome international-relations consequences of siding with the lower 
court,” but concluding that “[t]hese apprehensions are better directed to” Congress). 
 14.  132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012). 
 15.  Cohen, supra note 2, at 436–37. 
 16.  See Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 649, 652–53, 713 (2002) (prophesying that in a plurilateral, post–Cold War world, 
the Court would start to pull back on its traditional deference to the executive branch). 
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pro-presidential opinion in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II),17 
skepticism seems to be winning over deference most of the time. 
This Article explores how this broader trend has played out with 
regard to treaty interpretation. It also examines the treaty cases of 
the past ten years and compares them to the prior patterns described 
by the Restatement (Third).  
Part II looks at deference to the executive branch’s treaty 
interpretations. It puts the anecdotal evidence of diminishing 
deference in context by developing a complete data set of the 
Roberts Court treaty interpretation cases that can be compared to 
such sets from prior Courts. This data set suggests a significant shift 
at the Supreme Court; given how rarely the Court follows the 
executive’s views on the meaning of treaties, it might be fair to say 
that the Court does not defer at all. 
Part III looks at how the Court has reframed treaty questions, 
focusing, where possible, on domestic rather than international 
sources. The effect of this trend has been to sideline the president, 
increasing the Court’s interpretative authority at the expense of 
the executive. 
Part IV contemplates the current and future status of the “great 
weight” standard. Looking more closely at the treaty jurisprudence 
of the Courts of Appeals over the span of the Roberts Court, Part IV 
finds no evidence that the Supreme Court’s newfound skepticism of 
the executive branch’s treaty interpretations has caught on among 
lower courts. On the contrary, a new data set of the Circuit Courts’ 
treaty interpretations reveals that the Courts of Appeal still adopt the 
executive branch’s view the grand majority of the time. Should the 
Circuit Courts change their approach in light of the Roberts Court 
shifts? How should the Restatement (Fourth) approach deference to 
the executive branch in treaty interpretation? 
Part IV then considers the possible routes for the Restatement 
(Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law and whether a new doctrinal 
approach to treaty interpretation may be in order. The end goal is a 
doctrine of treaty interpretation that balances the courts’ authority 
“to say what the law is”18 with the executive branch’s expertise on 
treaties and their meaning, while also leaving space for the president 
 
 17.  Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 18.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
1.COHEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2016 7:33 AM 
1467 The Death of Deference 
 1471 
to articulate policies in U.S. relations with treaty partners and other 
states. The question is whether there is a doctrinal framework that 
can describe and harness the Roberts Court’s trends while fulfilling 
the United States’ varied goals in applying treaties. Part IV ends by 
suggesting that a “normalization”19 of treaty deference may be the 
best way to channel current trends into a positive doctrinal direction. 
II. WEIGHING EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEWS 
A. Treaty Deference Trends 
Courts have not always deferred to the executive branch’s 
interpretation of treaties. In fact, in the early years of the Republic, 
the Court seemed to do quite the opposite.20 Nevertheless, over the 
past century, a doctrine, or perhaps doctrines, of deference to 
executive treaty interpretations has gained force, ultimately achieving 
recognition in the Restatement (Third)’s determination that the 
executive branch’s interpretation was to be given “great weight.”21 
Two different paths led to this doctrine.22 One path drew upon 
the executive branch’s interpretations as evidence of the intent of the 
treaty framers.23 The executive branch’s interpretation deserved 
weight because the executive was involved in the negotiations and 
knew what the parties intended. The executive branch had no special 
power over treaty interpretation—it was for the courts to finally 
interpret the law—but the executive branch’s views were strong and 
useful evidence of the most accurate reading of the treaty’s terms.  
A second path produced a true deference doctrine.24 Cases on 
this path suggested that the executive should have some authority 
 
 19.  See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations 
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1970 (2015). 
 20.  See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A 
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506–07 (2007) (describing early 
nineteenth century cases). 
 21.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 22.  See Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive 
Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1741–44 (2007) (describing the two paths). 
 23.  Id. Chesney points to In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 468 (1891) and Nielsen v. Johnson, 
279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) as the primary cases in this line. 
 24.  Chesney, supra note 22, at 1741–44 (describing Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 
468 (1913) and Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921)). 
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over treaty interpretation that the courts should properly recognize. 
This path drew on traditional arguments for executive prerogative, 
like executive control of foreign affairs25 and the need for one 
voice,26 the executive’s involvement in everyday treaty interpretation, 
the need for flexibility in dealing with foreign states, the president’s 
political accountability with regard to foreign affairs,27 and the 
executive branch’s expertise in foreign policy. Gradually over time, 
the second justification crowded out the former.28 
The dominance of this deference model was suggested by 
empirical studies. In a study of the twenty-three treaty interpretation 
cases from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist eras, David Bederman 
found that the Court followed the executive’s interpretation in 
nineteen of twenty-three cases, or roughly 83% of the time.29 
Looking solely at treaty interpretation cases from the beginning of 
the Rehnquist Court until 1993, the percentage grew even higher. 
The Rehnquist Court adopted the executive branch’s view in nine of 
ten cases, or 90% of the time.30 Robert Chesney later updated and 
expanded the study to include treaty interpretation cases from 1984 
through 2005 at both the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts.31 Chesney found that in sixty-seven treaty interpretation 
cases, the executive prevailed fifty-three times, or 79% of the time.32 
Of the remaining fourteen cases, four were inconclusive. And of the 
ten cases that did not follow the executive, four were later reversed 
on appeal.33 If those four cases are excluded, the executive’s win-rate 
goes up to 84%. If one excludes the inconclusive cases, that win-rate 
rises to 90%. 
What do these percentages signify? How much deference do they 
suggest? It’s hard to tell. There are many reasons a court might 
 
 25.  See Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 792 (2008). 
 26.  Cf. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085–86 (2015) 
(wielding “one voice” justification to give the president exclusive control over issues related to 
recognition of states and governments). 
 27.  Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 591 (2007). 
 28.  Chesney, supra note 22, at 1744–48. 
 29.  David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
953, 975 n.108, 1015–16 n.422 (1994). 
 30.  Id. at 975 n.108. 
 31.  Chesney, supra note 22, at 1752–58. 
 32.  Id. at 1755. 
 33.  Id. 
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adopt the same interpretation as the executive. In particular, the 
executive does have the best knowledge of the treaty negotiations, 
and its proffered interpretation may simply be right or, at least, the 
most reasonable. The raw numbers cannot distinguish cases in which 
the court agrees with the executive from cases in which the court simply 
follows the executive regardless of, or even in spite of, its own view. 
Looking at how often the courts follow the executive in other 
cases can provide a helpful baseline. In a 2008 study, William 
Eskridge and Lauren Baer looked at cases involving either Chevron34 
or Skidmore35 deference, the two prominent standards for deference 
to administrative agency decisions.36 They found that from 1989 to 
2005, the courts adopted the same view as the administrative agency 
76.2% of the time when applying the test from Chevron and 73.5% of 
the time when applying the test from Skidmore.37 In a different study 
from 2006, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein found that, from 1989 
to 2005, the Supreme Court and circuit courts adopted the same 
view as the agency 67% of the time and 64% of the time 
respectively.38 By any standard, Chevron sets out a pretty deferential 
test: under Chevron, the court is supposed to defer to any reasonable 
agency interpretation.39 And yet the rates of agreement between the 
courts and the executive in those cases pale in comparison to the 
rates of agreement on treaty interpretation. Perhaps the executive is 
more likely to be correct in its interpretation of a treaty than a 
statute. Perhaps the potential reactions of other nations discipline the 
executive more than Congress does, making unreasonable treaty 
interpretations less likely than unreasonable agency interpretations of 
statutes. Both are, at the very least, debatable propositions. But the 
high numbers for treaties are at least suggestive that the courts were 
in fact giving the executive’s views on treaties “great weight.” As 
 
 34.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 35.  See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 36.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (describing the relationship 
between the two tests). 
 37.  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1083, 1099, 1125 (2008). 
 38.  Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 849 (2006). 
 39.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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David Bederman put it, deference to the executive is “the single best 
predictor of interpretive outcomes in American treaty cases.”40 
But then along came the Roberts Court. Hamdan was the first 
case to raise eyebrows and indicate that something might be 
changing.41 Hamdan involved the proper interpretation of Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.42 The question was whether 
the conflict with Al-Qaeda was “not of an international character,”43 
and thus covered by the treaty provision. The executive branch took 
the view that, because the conflict with Al-Qaeda was taking place all 
over the world, it was of an international character.44 The majority of 
the Court didn’t just reject the executive branch’s view; it rejected it 
out of hand. Interpreting Common Article 3 to cover any conflict 
not between two states, Justice Stevens described the executive 
branch’s view simply as “erroneous.”45 No mention was made of 
deference, of great weight, or of respect for the executive 
branch’s view. 
That decision in Hamdan, though, came one day after the Court 
cited the “great weight” standard and adopted the executive 
branch’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR) over that of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.46 And in other cases, particularly 
those interpreting the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”), the Court 
has followed the executive branch’s interpretation.47 One case might 
have been only an anomaly. 
 
 40.  Bederman, supra note 29, at 1015. 
 41.  See, e.g., Chesney, supra note 22, at 1726–27, 1729–33; Sullivan, supra note 25, at 782. 
 42.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006). 
 43.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
 44.  See Memorandum from President George W. Bush, to the Vice President, et al., on 
Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) at ¶ 2.c, reprinted in 
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134–35 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. 
Dratel eds., 2005). 
 45.  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630. It is possible that Justice Stevens was suggesting a new 
“clearly erroneous” standard. He does not say so clearly though, nor does he explain how it 
relates to the prior “great weight” standard. Thanks to Pamela Bookman for the point. 
 46.  548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006). 
 47.  See, e.g., Lozano v. Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014); Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 
1017 (2013); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1 (2010). Notably though, Justice Stevens, joined in 
his dissent in Abbott by Justices Thomas and Breyer, questioned whether the executive 
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The 2013 term gave Hamdan some company. While agreeing 
with the executive’s interpretation of the Hague Convention in 
Lozano, the Court summarily brushed aside the executive branch’s 
interpretation of the United Kingdom-Argentina Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (“BIT”) in BG Group and the Government’s position on the 
requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Bond.  
The Court’s reaction to the executive branch’s interpretation of 
the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT in BG Group is telling. “While 
we respect the Government’s views about the proper interpretation 
of treaties,” the Court explained, “we have been unable to find any 
other authority or precedent”48 supporting its view. Unconvinced, 
the Court “d[id] not accept the Solicitor General’s view as applied to 
th[is] treaty . . . .”49 
B. Examining the Roberts Court Data 
Anecdotally then, it seems that the Court may no longer be 
weighing the executive branch’s view of treaties as heavily. This 
impression is supported by a more careful analysis of the data. 
A close search of the cases reveals that between 2005 and 2015 
(i.e., the Roberts Court era to date) there have been twelve cases 
involving treaties. Ten of those required at least some interpretation 
of a treaty.50 Of those cases, the Court has agreed with the executive 
in five or six cases.51 Three of these five or six cases in which the 
 
branch’s view of the Hague Convention really was due to “great weight” in that case, 
accepting a much narrower range of circumstances in which such deference would be 
warranted. Abbott, 560 U.S. at 41–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 48.  BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (2014). 
 49.  Id. at 1208. 
 50.  Two of the twelve, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009), and Golan v. Holder, 
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012), ended up turning on something other than the treaty in question. In 
Negusie, the Court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals had wrongly relied on a prior 
Court decision, Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U. S. 490 (1981), and remanded the question 
to the agency for reconsideration. The Court thus never considered the meaning of the 
underlying treaties, the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 555 U.S. at 522–23. 
In Golan, the Government argued that extension of the copyright term for foreign works was 
justified by U.S. obligations under the Berne Convention. In the end though, no provision of 
the Berne Convention was really in question and nothing turned on its interpretation. 132 S. 
Ct. at 884–94. 
 51.  Medellín seems best counted as a partial victory and a partial defeat. See discussion 
infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
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Court agreed with the executive (Abbott v. Abbott,52 Chafin v. 
Chafin,53 and Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez54) involve interpretation of 
one treaty, the Hague Convention. As previously mentioned, the 
Court also sided with the executive branch rather than the ICJ in 
interpreting the in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.55 And the Court 
agreed with the executive branch in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, in which the executive branch argued 
that hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea, was covered by the 1971 U.N. 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.56 The Court parted with 
the executive in that case though on the effect of that interpretation, 
holding that United States’ obligations under the treaty alone could 
not serve as a justification for refusing a religious exemption for 
hoasca use under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,57 a 
different trend that I will come back to in Part III. 
The Court, on the other hand, parted ways with the executive in 
Hamdan, dismissing the executive branch’s view of the Geneva 
Conventions,58 and BG Group, rejecting the executive branch’s 
construction of the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT and largely 
brushing aside its concern about how similar language used in U.S. 
BITs might be interpreted by other courts.59 In Permanent Mission 
of India to the United Nations v. City of New York,60 the Court fails 
to even mention that the Solicitor General had submitted a brief61 
urging a different interpretation of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations than the one eventually adopted.62 Bond is a bit 
harder to categorize. The Solicitor General argued that the Chemical 
 
 52.  560 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 53.  133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013). 
 54.  134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014). 
 55.  548 U.S. 331, 345–50 (2006). 
 56.  546 U.S. 418, 422 (2005). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006). 
 59.  BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208–09 (2014). Justice Sotomayor, 
in her concurrence, does leave some space for a different result regarding the language in U.S. 
BITs. Id. at 1213–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 60.  551 U.S. 193 (2007). 
 61.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26–27, 
Permanent Mission of India to the U.N. v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193 (2007) 
(No. 06 134). 
 62.  551 U.S. at 201–02. 
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Weapons Convention prohibited the use of toxic chemicals “under 
any circumstances” not permitted by the Convention and required 
the United States to criminalize Carol Anne Bond’s attempted 
poisoning of her neighbor.63 Chief Justice Roberts attempts to avoid 
interpreting the Convention in his majority opinion,64 instead 
applying a presumption to the interpretation of the statute 
implementing the Convention. That said, after summarizing the 
history of the Convention, the Chief Justice initially suggests that 
the Convention would not have been understood to cover entirely 
local conduct like Bond’s attempted poisoning. “The Convention, a 
product of years of worldwide study, analysis, and multinational 
negotiation, arose in response to war crimes and acts of terrorism,”65 
the Chief Justice writes. “There is no reason to think the sovereign 
nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like 
Bond’s common law assault.”66 And while the interpretation that 
follows is of the statute rather than the treaty, the Court’s 
understanding of the treaty and its purposes clearly buttresses the 
majority’s view that “chemical weapons” as commonly understood, 
and as understood by the treaty’s drafters,67 does not normally 
include simple poisonings.68 Whether relying on that view or not, 
the Court is clearly not deferring to the president’s interpretation of 
the Convention. 
Medellín is the most complicated case to categorize. In his brief, 
the Solicitor General argued that according to their terms, neither 
the Optional Protocol to the VCCR nor the U.N. Charter is 
privately enforceable in U.S. Courts.69 Instead, “[t]he Optional 
Protocol and the U.N. Charter create an obligation to comply with 
 
 63.  Brief for the United States at 2, Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014) 
(No. 12-158). 
 64.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088 (“Fortunately, we have no need to interpret the scope of 
the Convention in this case.”). 
 65.  Id. at 2087. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. (quoting Ian R. Kenyon, Why We Need a Chemical Weapons Convention and an 
OPCW, in THE CREATION OF THE ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS 1, 17 (Ian R. Kenyon & Daniel Feakes eds., 2007)). 
 68.  See also Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1517 (observing that “the Court spends a great 
deal of effort in describing and interpreting the Chemical Weapons Convention itself”). 
 69.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 27–30, 
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984). 
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[the ICJ’s judgment in] Avena, and those treaties implicitly give the 
President authority to implement that treaty-based obligation on 
behalf of the Nation.”70 While the Court agreed with the former 
proposition, it went further than the government on the latter. 
Adopting a reading of the U.N. Charter’s “undertakes to comply” 
language nowhere suggested by the Solicitor General, the Court 
found the obligation to follow ICJ judgments non-self-executing 
and as such subject to implementation by Congress rather than the 
president alone.71 Depending on how we count it, Medellín could be 
categorized either with those cases in which the Court defers or 
those in which it does not. The best reading, I would suggest, is as a 
partial victory for the executive branch, bringing the count of cases 
in which the Roberts Court failed to defer to 4.5 out of 10. The 
Roberts Court’s rate of agreement with the executive would stand at 
55% and would still only be 60% even if Medellín is counted entirely 
among the executive’s victories. 
Beyond the high rate of disagreement (and perhaps even more 
tellingly), the Court mentions a standard of deference to the 
executive (the Restatement rule) in only four of the ten treaty 
interpretation cases,72 and in two of those four, the Court specifically 
chooses not to defer.73 The deference standard appears almost as an 
excuse for failing to defer in a particular case, an implicit suggestion 
that the case is merely an outlier and not a threat to the general rule. 
 
 70.  Id. at 11. 
 71.  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008). 
 72.  See id. at 513 (“[T]he United States’ interpretation of a treaty ‘is entitled to great 
weight.’” (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avangliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982))); 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (“[W]hile courts interpret treaties for 
themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged 
with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.” (quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon, 
366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961))); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15 (2010) (“[T]he Executive 
Branch’s interpretation of a treaty ‘is entitled to great weight.’” (quoting Sumimoto Shoji Am., 
457 U.S. at 185)); BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1209 (“[W]e respect the 
Government’s views about the proper interpretation of treaties.”). 
 73.  See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525 (“The United States maintains that . . . . the relevant 
treaties . . . ‘implicitly give the President authority to implement that treaty-based obligation’ . 
. . . We disagree.”) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11, Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984)); BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. 
at 1209 (“[W]hile we respect the Government’s views about the proper interpretation of 
treaties, we have been unable to find any other authority or precedent suggesting that the use 
of the ‘consent’ label in a treaty should make a critical difference in discerning the 
parties’ intent.”). 
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Disagreements with the executive branch are also spread broadly 
across the Court. Executive branch interpretations have been 
rejected by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Breyer, and 
Thomas. Additionally, the Court rejected the executive branch’s view 
in cases in which it appeared as party (Hamdan and Bond) and 
amicus (Permanent Mission of India and BG Group). 
C. Deference’s Slow Death? 
What’s going on here? Over the years, scholars have put forward 
any number of suggestions on how the deference standard for treaty 
interpretation could or should be tailored. Can these cases be 
reconciled with one of them? The suggestion made in the reporters’ 
notes to the Restatement (Third) seems to be an imperfect fit.74 The 
reporters’ notes explain that the Court is  
more likely to defer to an Executive interpretation previously made 
in diplomatic negotiation with other countries, on the ground that 
the United States should speak with one voice, than to one 
adopted by the Executive in relation to a case before the courts, 
especially where individual rights or interests are involved.75  
The Roberts Court, though, has been following the executive 
branch in precisely those cases involving private interests, specifically, 
the Hague Convention cases,76 while diplomacy and negotiation-
based arguments in BG Group and Bond have fallen on deaf ears.77 
An argument could be made that the government’s interpretations in 
 
 74.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 326 reporters’ note 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
75.    Id. 
 76.  See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 1228 (2014) (examining whether 
a time period in the Hague Convention was “subject to equitable tolling when the abducting 
parent conceal[ed] the child’s location from the other parent”); Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 
1017, 1021 (2013) (considering whether, after a child was returned to her country of habitual 
residence pursuant to an order issued under the requirements of the Hague Convention, an 
appeal of the order was moot); Abbott, 560 U.S. at 5 (examining “whether a parent has a 
‘righ[t] of custody’ by reason of that parent’s ne exeat right: the authority to consent before 
the other parent may take the child to another country”). 
 77.  See BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1208 (rejecting Solicitor General’s argument that a local 
litigation provision may have been “a condition on the State’s consent to enter into an 
arbitration agreement”); Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014) (dismissing the 
government’s argument that an adverse holding would “undermine confidence in the United 
States as an international treaty partner”). 
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Hamdan, BG Group, and Bond, at least, were mere litigating 
positions. In particular, some have viewed the executive branch’s 
positions on the Geneva Conventions,78 the U.K.-Argentina BIT,79 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention80 as unprincipled and 
perhaps opportunistic. It is hardly clear though that that was true in 
those cases, and the Court gives little to hint that it was part of 
their reasoning. 
Others have suggested that the deference standard had been 
softened in an earlier case, El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng.81 
That decision cited the “great weight” standard, but further 
explained that “[r]espect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the 
executive branch concerning the meaning of an international 
treaty.”82 To some observers, this standard sounded like a retreat to 
something similar to Chevron or even Skidmore deference.83 Under 
this standard, only “reasonable views of the executive branch” need 
be considered, and those are due only “respect.” In his previously 
mentioned study, Robert Chesney tried to examine whether El Al 
really was a turning point, specifically whether courts had been any 
less deferential afterwards than they had been before.84 He found 
little difference, noting that the courts agreed with the executive 
branch in twenty-nine of thirty-four cases (or 85%) before El Al and 
twenty-three of twenty-eight (or 82%) afterwards.85 Still, more time 
has passed since El Al, and perhaps its effects have only now fully 
sunk in. Perhaps the Court’s view in Hamdan, Bond, BG Group, and 
Permanent Mission of India is that the executive branch’s 
 
 78.  See, e.g., John Cerone, Making Sense of the U.S. President’s Intervention in Medellín, 
31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 279, 295 (2008) (describing the executive’s invocation of 
international law as “opportunistic”). 
 79.  See, e.g., Anthea Roberts & Christina Trahanas, Judicial Review of Investment Treaty 
Awards: BG Group v. Argentina, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 762 (2014) (explaining that the 
U.S. Government sought to “draw a line that looked ad hoc and self-serving”). 
 80.  See, e.g., Julian Ku, A Quick Reaction to Oral Argument in Bond v. U.S.: Missouri v. 
Holland is in Real Trouble, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 5, 2013, 2:14 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/11/05/quick-reaction-oral-argument-bond-v-u-s-missouri-v-
holland-real-trouble/. 
 81.  525 U.S. 155 (1999). 
 82.  Id. at 168. 
 83.  See, e.g., Joshua Weiss, Defining Executive Deference in Treaty Interpretation Cases, 
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1592, 1594–95 (2011). 
 84.  Chesney, supra note 22, at 1756–58. 
 85.  Id. 
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interpretation in each is simply unreasonable and unworthy of 
respect. No mention, however, is made of either El Al or its 
potential new standard. 
These are just two possible doctrinal suggestions. The scholarly 
literature offers a full spectrum of possible treaty interpretation 
deference standards,86 with advocates for total deference to executive 
branch views,87 Chevron,88 Skidmore,89 sliding-scales of deference 
based on other available evidence of a treaty’s meaning,90 and almost 
no deference at all.91 Scholars have suggested granting more 
deference on bilateral foreign policy issues and less on issues between 
private parties,92 distinguishing cases based on whether the 
interpretation reflects a consistent internal policy or a one-time 
litigating position,93 or that deference be denied the executive in 
cases determining the scope of the executive’s own authority.94 This 
Article could, with some finessing, try to reconcile the Roberts 
Court opinions with any number of these proposals. 
But this discussion of potential deference standards misses the 
forest for the trees. The Roberts Court trend away from deference is 
stark, particularly in comparison to the trend towards greater 
deference that came before. One should, of course, be careful not to 
make too much of the numbers. This data on the Roberts Court is a 
very small sample and these cases may not be representative. For 
example, cases of executive overreach may have been more likely to 
 
 86.  See id. at 1759–71 (collecting and describing proposals); Weiss, supra note 83, at 
1600–07 (same). 
 87.  John Yoo, Politics as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of 
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 864–82 (2001). 
 88.  Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L. J. 1170 (2007); Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 
649, 650 (2000). 
 89.  Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1927, 1928–34 (2003). 
 90.  Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call 
for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1942–43 (2005); Weiss, supra note 86, at 1607–12. 
 91.  Alex Glashausser, Difference and Deference in Treaty Interpretation, 50 VILL. L. 
REV. 25, 27 (2005). 
 92.  Van Alstine, supra note 90. 
 93.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 326 reporters’ notes 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 94.  Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1970 (2015). 
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reach the Supreme Court (perhaps the Court is more likely to grant 
certiorari in such cases), something the circuit courts’ much higher 
rate of agreement with the executive might suggest.95 But that was 
not the pattern in the past; Bederman found a 90% rate of agreement 
between the Rehnquist Court and the executive branch.96 Perhaps 
the Roberts Court is uniquely on the lookout for such cases of 
overreach in deciding whether to grant certiorari. That said, a 55 to 
60% rate of agreement still seems very low. Moreover, 55 to 60% 
probably overstates the amount of deference the Court is granting. 
In a number of the cases decided in favor of the executive, the result 
seems over-determined, with all of the other evidence of the treaty’s 
proper meaning pointing in the same direction as that suggested by 
the executive branch.97 It is hard to find a case in which the Court 
truly defers, adopting an interpretation despite some inclination in 
another direction. Moreover, we should expect the Court and the 
executive to agree on treaty interpretation much of the time. They 
are both looking at the same evidence, including evidence of what 
other treaty parties think the treaty means. We might expect that 
even in the absence of any knowledge of the executive branch’s view 
of a treaty, the Court would adopt the same view as the executive at 
least half the time.98 
 
 95.  See infra Part IV. 
 96.  See Bederman, supra note 29, at 975 n.108, 1015–16 n.422. 
 97.  See, e.g, Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10–15 (2010) (laying out the Court’s 
independent analysis of the treaty); id. at 16 (adding that “[t]his Court’s conclusion that ne 
exeat rights are rights of custody is further informed by the views of other contracting states”); 
id. at 20 (explaining that the Court’s view also “accords with [the treaty’s] objects and 
purposes”); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006) (first adopting an 
interpretation of the ICJ Statute, and then, finding the view of the executive branch to be in 
accord); id. at 347–50 (interpreting the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations directly, 
without reference to the executive branch’s view); id. at 356 (“Bustillo points to nothing in 
the drafting history of Article 36 or in the contemporary practice of other signatories that 
undermines this conclusion.”). 
 98.  The counterargument would be that the executive has incentives to interpret 
treaties to accord with its policy goals rather than objective evidence of the treaty’s meaning. 
That is certainly true in some cases, and one might have intuitions that it would be the case in 
more. But the United States does not always appear as a party (rather than amicus), and in the 
absence of evidence of an ulterior motive, we might assume that the strongest, general interest 
of the United States is in adopting an interpretation that will carry the fewest repercussions 
with our treaty counterparties. Of course, a different way of putting all of this is that what is 
surprising is not that the Roberts Court so often disagrees with the executive, but that the 
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At 55 to 60%, it looks like the “great weight” standard, while 
still peaking over the water from time to time, is sinking. In contrast 
to the prior period, executive branch views now seem poor 
predictors of what the Court will actually decide. In fact, it begins to 
look as though the Court is granting the executive branch no 
deference at all in the interpretation of treaties. 
Descriptively, we seem to be returning to the “evidence of 
intent” or persuasiveness model, in which the executive branch’s 
views are valued mostly for their ability to help unravel what treaty 
provisions actually mean. They are not given special authority above 
and beyond their persuasiveness. And normatively, this might be the 
right move to reign in executive overreaching at precisely a time 
when the number of policy issues covered by treaty obligations, e.g., 
local murder99 and attempted murder,100 seem to be expanding. But 
as evidenced in BG Group, the cost of this move is that it may ignore 
executive branch positions that are not built on the intent of the 
treaty drafters—in that case the drafters were the United Kingdom 
and Argentina—but instead on carefully considered foreign policy 
positions of the United States.101 
III. DOMESTICATING TREATY QUESTIONS 
The Court’s control over treaty interpretation during the 
Roberts Court era has been reinforced by a second trend: 
domestication. Increasingly, the Court seems to be working to 
assimilate treaty interpretation questions into more traditional 
domestic-constitutional, statutory, or contract ones. 
Some observers have worried that the Court may be turning in 
some treaty interpretation cases to domestic rather than international 
standards of interpretation. Such a trend could be dangerous, these 
observers worry, if the Court begins to interpret treaty obligations 
differently from other nations. The Court’s use of traditional U.S. 
 
executive’s interpretation has so often diverged from the objective evidence of the treaty’s 
meaning. Such a trend might very well explain the trend towards less deference. 
 99.  See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 100.  See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 101.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The Solicitor General had argued that 
the language of the U.K.-Argentina BIT was similar to language the United States had used in 
its own BIT and that the United States interpreted in specific ways. BG Grp., PLC v. 
Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1189, 1209–10 (2014). 
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contract law principles to interpret the U.K.-Argentina BIT in BG 
Group102 and its application of a presumption of federalism or of 
common English understanding to the language of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention in Bond103 might seem particularly worrisome. 
But this may not be the best interpretation of these decisions. In 
other treaty interpretation cases during this period, particularly ones 
concerning the Hague Convention, the Court actually seems to be 
embracing international standards of treaty interpretation like those 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.104 The better 
reading of opinions like BG Group and Bond, I would suggest, is that 
the Court is increasingly separating interpretation of the treaty from 
interpretation of domestic obligations and, in particular, treaty 
interpretation from interpretation of the implementing legislation.105 
And cases that some might suggest should turn on interpretation of 
a treaty are instead turning on something else. 
Thus in Bond, Chief Justice Roberts distinguishes between the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and the implementing legislation, 
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, even 
though the language of the two is almost identical.106 He then 
focuses on the latter, which, as an act of Congress, is subject to 
ordinary methods of statutory interpretation, including application 
of various presumptions. In this case, the Chief Justice applies a 
presumption that Congress intends to keep the normal balance of 
federal-state relations unless it clearly states otherwise,107 finds 
 
 102.  See Roberts & Trahanas, supra note 79, at 755. 
 103.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088, 2090 (noting that “it is appropriate to refer to basic 
principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal 
statute,” looking to what an “an ordinary person would associate with instruments of chemical 
warfare,” and observing that “an educated user of English would not describe Bond’s crime as 
involving a ‘chemical weapon’”). 
 104.  See Roger P. Alford, Bond and the Vienna Rules, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 
1566–70 (2015); see also Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1511–12 (noting the convergence 
between the Court’s approach and international rules, but suggesting that it is more “likely 
one rooted in common imperatives . . . than in direct causal ties”). 
 105.  Although they are related and moving in parallel, this trend is distinct from the one 
away from deference. The Court sometimes uses one, sometimes the other, and sometimes 
both in the same decision. The Court seems to be experimenting with techniques of 
interpretative control, rather than adopting a single coherent methodology. 
 106.  Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2088. 
 107.  Id. at 2089–90. 
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ambiguity in the term “chemical weapons,”108 and thus determines 
the statute should not be understood to cover Carol Anne Bond’s 
“ordinary” attempted poisoning—a matter usually left to state law.109 
Although Chief Justice Roberts might be inclined to interpret the 
Chemical Weapons Convention similarly,110 the logic is applicable 
only to a congressionally-enacted statute. 
In BG Group, Justice Breyer uses “ordinary contract”111 
principles to determine whether the U.K.-Argentina BIT’s local 
litigation requirement is a question of “arbitrability” (subject to 
judicial review) or procedure (left to the arbitrators).112 This might 
seem odd. Why should a treaty between two non-U.S. parties be 
interpreted according to U.S. contract law rather than international 
treaty law? Buried in the opinion is Justice Breyer’s answer. When 
parties appear before U.S. courts to have awards confirmed or 
vacated under international arbitration agreements, that process is 
governed by an American statute, the Federal Arbitration Act,113 and 
under that Act, the federal court “should normally apply the 
presumptions supplied by American law.”114 It is thus in that unique 
posture that the Court interprets the U.K.-Argentina BIT. 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal also 
turns on questions of statutory, rather than treaty, law.115 The Court 
in that case accepts the executive branch’s view that hoasca is 
covered by the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.116 
Following principles of U.S. law, however, the Court determines that 
U.S. obligations under that treaty are not, in and of themselves, 
sufficient justification for denying a religious exception under a U.S. 
statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.117 Additionally, in 
Negusie v. Holder, the Court avoids interpreting the Refugee 
Convention by holding that both the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 
 108.  Id. at 2090–91. 
 109.  Id. at 2091–92. 
 110.  See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 111.  BG Grp., PLC v. Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206 (2014). 
 112.  Id. at 1206–07. 
 113.  Id. at 1205. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  546 U.S. 418, 438 (2006). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
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and Fifth Circuit incorrectly relied on a prior Supreme Court case.118 
The Court thus bases its decision on a domestic source, Supreme 
Court precedent, over which it can claim ultimate 
interpretative authority. 
This trend of isolating the statutory or constitutional questions 
from treaty questions runs in parallel with a trend toward less 
deference to the executive on treaty interpretation. By shifting the 
question away from areas in which the executive might have special 
expertise or a special role towards areas within the Court’s ordinary 
bailiwick, the Court essentially removes the executive from the 
equation. The executive’s view of a treaty becomes irrelevant. 
And Medellín encourages this development. Even if we don’t 
read Medellín to establish a presumption against treaty self-
execution,119 Medellín does increase the uncertainty of whether any 
treaty provision will be found to be self-executing.120 This 
uncertainty increases the importance of implementing legislation or 
other statutory bases for applying the treaty, which in turn, increases 
the interpretative focus on those sources rather than the treaty. 
In the end, interpreting the Constitution or statutes, rather than 
treaties, allows the Court to consider questions specific to American 
law—like federalism or separation of powers—without: (1) doing 
damage to the treaty; (2) setting precedents about how the treaty 
should be interpreted by other states; and (3) asserting that the 
United States is not bound by its obligations. But, the drawback of 
this trend is that it drives a wedge between treaty commitment and 
compliance; even enacting the treaty’s precise language into law is no 
guarantee that the treaty’s obligations will be effective as U.S. law.121 
 
 118.  555 U.S. at 522–23. The outliers here are again the Vienna Convention cases. 
Although those cases technically involve the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 11601, rather than the treaty, the Court has acted as though they are interpreting the 
treaty directly. See Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1512. 
 119.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2014). 
 120.  John R. Crook, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 100 (2010) (“Seeking to address uncertainty 
regarding the self-executing character of some U.S. treaties following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is acting to 
document the Senate’s intentions regarding new treaties.”). 
 121.  See Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1523 (noting the problem with using different 
standards to interpret treaties, implementing legislation, and endorsing the opposite view: 
“[a]n incorporative statute should be interpreted in light of the underlying treaty”); Edward T. 
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IV. WEIGHING “GREAT WEIGHT” 
Given the current Roberts Court trends regarding treaties, what 
is left of the “great weight” standard? Is the Roberts Court’s 
approach an interesting exception or the foundation of a new rule? 
Should the Restatement (Fourth) amend or drop the “great 
weight” standard? 
A. Mixed Messages; Mixed Results 
The small sample of Roberts Court treaty cases and the relatively 
short period of time make it difficult to assess where things actually 
stand. Further complicating matters are the Court’s deliberately 
mixed messages: the Court continues to cite deference standards 
even as it brushes aside executive branch interpretations.122 Is the 
Court signaling that the standard remains alive, particularly for lower 
federal courts—a sort of “listen to what we say, not what we do” 
lesson? Is it signaling a change in the meaning or interpretation of 
“great weight”? Does “great weight” weigh less than it once did? 
And then there is the question of how lower federal courts have 
actually responded, particularly as the grand majority of treaty 
interpretations cases never reach the Supreme Court.123 
Appendix 1 shows a circuit-by-circuit study of all appellate 
decisions interpreting a treaty in which the executive branch has 
expressed its view from 2005 through 2014.124 These results do not 
 
Swaine, Bond’s Breaches, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2015) (expressing similar 
concerns). But see David H. Moore, Treaties and the Presumption Against Preemption, 
2015 BYU L. REV. 1555, 1575–76 (2016) (suggesting such concerns may be overstated 
and avoidable). 
 122.  See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 123.  Appendix 1, for example, shows thirty-four treaty interpretation cases from the 
Courts of Appeals during the Roberts Court era. This is a purposely conservative count. 
During that same period, the Supreme Court only heard ten to twelve such cases. 
 124.  To assemble this dataset, research assistants searched the Westlaw database for 
federal court decisions going back to 1987, the date of publication for the last Restatement, 
using the search query: “(treaty or (international /s convention) or (international /s 
agreement)) /p interpret!” It is possible that a few cases may have been missed by the search, 
but it unlikely they would have made a difference to the sample. They then coded each case for 
(1) the treaty in question, (2) whether the executive branch expressed a view, (3) whether the 
court adopted that view, and (4) what standard of deference, if any, the court applied. A 
second research assistant and I each re-read the cases and checked the results. Not all decisions 
are crystal clear on what they are doing and some borderline cases had to be categorized. We 
tried to be conservative in including cases in this final set. For the purposes of this article, only 
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necessarily tell us how these courts are receiving the Supreme 
Court’s signals or how much deference these courts are actually 
giving the executive branch. They are, at best, imperfect proxies. For 
one thing, it should take time for any effect of the Roberts Court 
opinions to be felt, and the samples get too small the closer we get 
to the present to tell us much. Beyond that though, the numbers do 
not do a very good job of measuring how much weight or 
“deference” is actually given.  
Deference, of course, means something different from just 
coming out the same way. Deference implies instead that the 
executive interpretation is either taking the place of other 
interpretative evidence or overruling it. But these cases generally 
seem overdetermined. When the courts agree with the executive, 
they often cite to other evidence of the treaty’s meaning, which 
supports the same view and includes the courts’ own independent 
interpretation of the text.125 This might suggest that deference is not 
doing much work. On the flipside, even where courts are truly 
deferring, they may want to put their decision on the most solid 
ground possible and may want to buttress that deference with other 
evidence, obscuring the real role the executive branch’s view played 
in the courts’ decision. 
All that said, the data shows that the circuit courts are still 
adopting the executive’s position the grand majority of the time. 
Appendix 1 shows thirty-four circuit court cases involving the 
interpretation of a treaty in which the executive expressed a view.126 
 
Roberts Court-era cases were included. The broader dataset though does not suggest 
different patterns. 
 125.  See, e.g., Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1, 13, 15 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that the 
drafting history of the Hague Child Abduction Convention and its interpretation by foreign 
courts weighed in favor of not applying equitable tolling to a provision of that treaty); 
Fulwood v. Fed. Rep. of Ger., 734 F.3d 72, 78 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiff’s 
interpretation of a bilateral treaty between Germany and the U.S. conflicted with the treaty’s 
clear text); De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations due to the practices 
of “other States-parties to the convention” and the treaty’s text); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 
F.3d 123, 135 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that the government’s view of residual immunity in the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was, “supported by the Vienna Convention’s 
drafting history”). 
 126.  This includes cases in which the executive branch’s view is merely implied, for 
example, because it brought the prosecution or started the extradition process on the basis of a 
treaty interpretation challenged in the case. The study found many more cases of treaty 
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In only four of those did the court reject the view proffered by the 
executive branch.127 The circuit courts have thus agreed with the 
executive 88% of the time, a number in line with trends of recent 
decades.128 That said, it remains uncertain exactly what the Courts of 
Appeals are doing. The “great weight” standard” is mentioned in 
only twelve of the thirty-four cases (or 35% of the time).129 In one of 
those, World Holdings, LLC v. Federal Republic of Germany,130 the 
court rejected the executive branch’s view and in at least one other, 
De Los Santos Mora v. New York,131 the court added its own caveats 
to that standard—in that case, a requirement that great weight was 
only due when there was a “settled view of the executive under 
successive national administrations.”132 In eleven of the decisions, no 
standard of deference is mentioned at all.133 If the Courts of Appeals 
are deferring, they are hardly publicizing that fact, suggesting they 
might be, at the very least, uncertain how much deference the 
executive really deserves. 
B. Toward a Restatement (Fourth)? 
So what does this mean for the Restatement (Fourth)? This raises 
complicated questions that go to the heart of the restatement 
process. Is the goal of the Restatement to simply record where 
 
interpretation where the executive branch expressed no view or where its view was not 
recorded in any way. It is possible that the executive branch did express a view in some of the 
latter cases and that those should be coded as cases in which the executive’s view was rejected, 
but it is unlikely there are many such cases as failure to deal with the executive branch’s view 
would likely have led to complaints and calls for rehearing the case. It is also possible that the 
executive branch expressed unrecorded views in cases in which the court agreed with it, and 
it’s unlikely the executive branch would have complained about its invisibility in those. All in 
all, it seems reasonable to work only with those cases in which the executive’s view is 
clearly recorded. 
 127.  These cases have a “No” under the “Did court agree with Government?” column 
in Appendix 1. 
 128.  See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 129.  These cases include the phrase “Great weight” under the “Deference Standard 
Applied“ column in Appendix 1. 
 130.  613 F.3d 1310, 1317 n.11 (2010). 
 131.  524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 
(1st Cir. 2000)). 
 132.  Id. at 188. 
 133.  These cases include the phrase “Deference not mentioned” under the “Deference 
Standard Applied“ column in Appendix 1. 
1.COHEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2016 7:33 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
1490 
things stand at publication or is it to make sense of current 
developments and channel them into the most positive 
possible directions? 
If the goal is to simply map where law is, the next Restatement 
should at least record the potential move away from great weight 
standard, at least in the reporters’ notes. Section 106(5) of the most 
recent draft of the Restatement (Fourth) rearticulates the old 
standard that “[c]ourts of the United States . . . will ordinarily give 
great weight to an interpretation by the executive branch.”134 The 
reporters’ notes though do acknowledge that the court “at times has 
declined to follow the interpretation of the executive branch, 
sometimes without citing the ‘great weight’ standard.”135 This is a 
step in the right direction, but the eventual, final Restatement 
(Fourth) would do well to note that the recent cluster of cases 
actually raises doubt about the standard’s continued vibrance. 
Beyond the question of deference, the next Restatement should 
probably also note the potential differences between implementing 
legislation and the treaty itself and choices available to courts to 
interpret one or the other. 
But reading the two trends together suggests a path toward 
progressive development of the U.S. law on treaty interpretation. 
Together, these two trends suggest a broader domestication of the 
treaty negotiation process, not just a domestication of the question 
before the court, but a domestication of the deference due executive 
interpretations. In such an integrated treaty practice, treaty 
interpretation questions would be, as much as possible, assimilated 
into domestic interpretive methods. When possible, the court will 
interpret the statute or other domestic authority rather than the 
treaty. When not possible, the court will interpret the treaty itself, 
using techniques appropriate for an instrument negotiated between 
states, but granting the executive no more deference than it would in 
statutory interpretation. This would align practice to a large extent 
with the suggestion of Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth that 
deference on foreign affairs issues be normalized and assimilated into 
 
 134.  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TREATIES § 106(5) (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2015). 
 135.  Id. § 106 reporters’ note 8. 
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the broader methods of U.S. law.136 In many cases, this practice 
might mean no deference to the executive branch. In most though, 
it might mean something like Skidmore, or persuasiveness deference, 
where the executive’s view is valued for its expertise and as a gloss on 
other available evidence. In some, where the executive has a 
longstanding, well-worked out view of the treaty or provision, one 
potentially even at odds with what other nations think, it might be 
due something like Chevron deference. This would recognize the 
dual role played by the executive in treaty interpretation—on the one 
hand, as an administrator of our treaty obligations responsible for 
the everyday interpretation of what those treaties require, and on the 
other, as negotiator-in-chief, articulating the United States’ views of 
the law to and with the rest of the world. In at least some cases, the 
executive branch treaty interpretations will themselves be acts of 
diplomacy and negotiation. Even then, though, as Sitaraman and 
Wuerth suggest, deference would be subject to a similar reasonableness 
standard,137 and the executive should not be granted special deference 
in defining the scope of its own powers under a treaty.138 
Whether or not such a “normalization” of treaty interpretation 
accurately or fully reflects the current state of the law, normalization 
might be the most normatively appealing way to harness the trends 
already in effect. Its main advantages are its coherence and relative 
clarity. One could make a strong argument that internationalization 
would be a more normatively appealing approach. Treaties should be 
read as international commitments, the executive’s foreign policy 
concerns should be given primacy, implementing legislation should 
be read in accordance with international law, and the most important 
presumption should be Charming Betsy.139 Such an approach might 
do the best job aligning the United States with its international 
commitments.140 The debate between these two visions cannot be 
resolved here. To the extent though that the Court seems to already 
 
 136.  Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 94. 
 137.  Id. at 1969–70. 
 138.  Id. at 1970. 
 139.  According to the Charming Betsy presumption, “an act of Congress ought never to 
be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 140.  See Galbraith, supra note 7, at 1523; Swaine, supra note 121, at 1518; John F. Coyle, 
Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 680 (2010). 
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be moving in the direction of normalization or domestication, 
reifying that approach can at least clarify the baselines against which 
the president, Congress, and the courts are working. The president is 
on notice how to argue about treaty interpretation, Congress is on 
notice how implementing legislation will be read and how it might 
need to be amended, and the courts are on notice where to start 
their inquiries. Foreign policy implications and concerns can be 
assessed and managed with those baseline understandings in mind. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s opinion of executive branch treaty 
interpretations seems to be in flux. The Roberts Court, at least, 
seems uncertain whether executive branch interpretations truly 
deserve to be given “great weight” when the Court is asked to 
interpret a treaty. But the doubt visible in the Supreme Court’s, and 
to a much lesser extent, the circuit court’s treatment of executive 
branch treaty interpretations has yet to make it into drafts of the 
Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States. Nor have the drafts of Restatement (Fourth) noted the 
Court’s moves to domesticate treaty interpretations and to 
distinguish treaties from implementing legislation. Whether the 
reporters agree with these moves or not, they must acknowledge 
them. If they do not, there is risk the Restatement (Fourth) could be 
outdated before it’s even finalized.  
The Court is chipping away at the “great weight” standard. The 
reporters for the Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States must now decide whether to buttress it or to let 
it topple and begin to build a new one. 
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